Objects & Events
Light hits our eyes and somehow we perceive 3 dimensional ‘objects’. What is an object? In representational systems like programming languages, objects are core structure. Is the same true for our cognitive system? Are objects learned or innate?
Similar to object, events seem like a great candidate for an ontological type. Formal semanticists have illustrated time and time again that they are important for explaining language. But are events core conceptual knowledge?
Primary Readings
Everyone should read these and be prepared to discuss.
| Spelke, E.S. (1990) | Principles of object perception. Cognitive Science, 14(1), 29-56. |
| Zacks, J. M., & Tversky, B. (2001) | Event structure in perception and conception. Psychological Bulletin, 127(1), 3. |
Secondary Readings
The presenter should read and incorporate at least two of these.
| Fillmore, C. J. (1970) | The grammar of hitting and breaking. Readings in English Transformational Grammar, 120-133. (on Learn)This research explores the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge of language, focusing on the verbs “hit” and “break” in English. Fillmore argues that while speakers may struggle to explain the usage and meaning of these words, they rarely make mistakes when using them. He emphasizes the need for linguistic observations to be incorporated into an empirical theory of linguistic structure. It explores the ambiguity of sentences and the role of body-part nouns in indicating places rather than objects. |
| Lettvin, J. Y. et al., (1957) | What the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain. Proceedings of the IRE, 47(11), 1940-1951.This paper presents research on the activity of single fibers in the optic nerve of frogs. The authors investigate what kind of stimulus causes the largest activity in one nerve fiber and what aspect of that stimulus is most excitatory. They find that the pattern of local variation in intensity, rather than the light intensity itself, is the most excitatory factor for the frog’s eye. The study provides a detailed analysis of the anatomy, physiology, and behavior of the frog’s visual apparatus. The research emphasizes that the frog’s eye informs the brain about the visual image in terms of local pattern, independent of average illumination. The findings suggest that the frog’s visual system is highly organized and interpreted, and not simply transmitting an accurate copy of the distribution of light. |
| Biederman, I. (1987) | Recognition-by-Components: A Theory of Human Image Understanding. Psychological Review, 94(2), 115.This article discusses the theory of recognition-by-components (RBC) in human image understanding. The theory proposes that objects are perceived by segmenting the input image into simple geometric components called geons. These geons can be derived from the contrasts of certain properties of edges in the image. The theory suggests that object recognition is robust and invariant to changes in viewing position and image quality. Experimental findings support the theory. |
| Scholl, Brian J. (2007) | Object persistence in philosophy and psychology. Mind & Language, 22(5), 563-591.This article explores the concept of object persistence in both philosophy and psychology. It suggests that there are similarities between these two fields, indicating that psychological mechanisms may underlie the intuitions about persistence that fuel metaphysical theories. The goal is to bridge the gap between cognitive science and metaphysics and potentially contribute to philosophical progress. The article discusses themes such as spatiotemporal continuity, persistence through property change, and cohesion, and how these themes have led to empirical discoveries in psychological research. It also explores various scenarios and challenges our intuitions about the identity and persistence of objects over time. The article highlights the importance of cohesion as a principle for object persistence and discusses the role of intuitions and psychological mechanisms in influencing our judgments and interpretations. It also considers the potential for psychology to contribute to philosophy in understanding the origins of metaphysical intuitions. |
Questions under discussion
- How do we represent object information?
- What’s missing from these representations?
- Events: linguistic artifact or core knowledge?
